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JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j).
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Denial of motion for new trial or additur, insufficient evidence.
The Court of Appeals should uphold the trial court's decision to deny Harris's motion for
a new trial or additur. Appellant (Harris) argued insufficient evidence, as illustrated by
her perceived inadequacy of the jury's award of $15,000 in current economic damages
and $10,000 in future economic damages. The trial court found that there was significant
evidence to support the jury's verdict. {Addendum of Appellant at A-22 - A24).
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to deny a
new trial if there is reasonable basis to support that decision, Crooks ton v. Fire Insurance
Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991); and will only reverse if it finds clear abuse of
discretion. Markham v. Bradley, 2007 UT App. 379, % 14; 173 P. 3d 865.
Issue No. 2: Denial of motion for new trial or additur, passion or prejudice.
The Court of Appeals should uphold the trial court's decision to deny Harris's motion for
a new trial or additur. Harris argued the jury acted under the influence of passion or
prejudice, as illustrated by her perceived inadequacy of the jury's award of $1,000 in
non-economic damages. The trial court found that there was significant evidence to
support the jury's verdict. (Addendum of Appellant at A24).
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to deny a
new trial if there is a reasonable basis to support that decision, Crooks ton v. Fire

Insurance Exchange, 817 P. 2d 789, 805 (Utah 1991); and will only reverse if it finds
clear abuse of discretion. Smith v. Fairfax Realty, 2003 UT 41, ^ 25; 82 P. 3d 1064.
Issue No. 3: Use of Harris' deposition by Harris' counsel. The Court of
Appeals should find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it directed
Harris' counsel to ask Harris a question before resorting to use of Harris's deposition
during redirect, after ShopKo's counsel had used Harris' deposition to impeach Harris
during cross-examination.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence and will only reverse upon a finding of clear abuse of discretion.
Jensen v. Intermountain Power, 1999 UT 10, f 12; 977 P. 2d 474; Ford v. American
Express Financial Advisors, 2004 UT 70, If 33 FN 5; 98 P. 3d 15. A party who
voluntarily abandons a line of questioning waives any assignment of error for that tactical
decision. Chournos v. D'agnillo, 642 P. 2d 710, 713 (Utah 1982).
Issue No. 4: Exclusion of chair specifications drawing as exhibit. The Court of
Appeals should find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded a
technical drawing of a chair for lack of foundation, when Harris did not include the
drawing in its request for stipulation and sought to introduce it through a witness with no
knowledge of the drawing.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence for lack of foundation and will only reverse upon a finding of clear
abuse of discretion. Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, ^ 6; 214 P. 3d 865.
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Issue No. 5: Jury instruction on present cash value. The Court of Appeals
should find that the trial court properly instructed the jury on present cash value using the
Model Jury Instructions after Harris presented evidence of future medical costs.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews jury instructions for correctness and
will uphold the instructions "when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the
jury on the law applicable to the case." Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, ^J
8; 214 P. 3d 865.
Issue No. 6: Jury instruction on apportionment of damages to pre-existing
conditions. The Court of Appeals should find that the trial court properly instructed the
jury on apportionment to pre-existing conditions using the Model Jury Instructions when
the evidence was in conflict as to the cause of damages.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals reviews jury instructions for correctness and
will uphold the instructions "when the instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the
jury on the law applicable to the case." Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, \
8; 214 P. 3d 865.
Issue No. 7: Testimony on delayed recovery syndrome. The Court of Appeals
should find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted testimony
relevant to whether Harris' medical care was necessary and reasonable.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence on relevance grounds and will only reverse upon a finding of clear
abuse of discretion. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, \ 17; 979 P. 2d 317.

Issue No. 8: Testimony on Harris' counsel drafting expert report. The Court of
Appeals should find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
testimony that Harris' expert witness report was drafted by counsel, given that the expert
admitted signing Ihe report before reviewing all the medical evidence.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence on overly prejudicial grounds and will only reverse upon a finding of
clear abuse of discretion. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, \ 17; 979 P. 2d 317.
Issue No. 9: Testimony by Harris' husband on intimate (conjugal)
relationship. The Court of Appeals should find that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion when it excluded testimony from Harris' husband as to the couple's intimate
relationship, when no claim was made for loss of consortium, Harris testified at length on
loss of quality of life issues and Harris' husband was allowed to bolster her testimony
with the exception of the intimate relationship.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will uphold a trial court's decision to admit
or exclude evidence on relevance grounds and will only reverse upon a finding of clear
abuse of discretion. Slisze v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, % 17; 979 P. 2d 317.
Issue No. 10: Admission of Doctor's College's written Curriculum Vitae (CV)
in evidence. The Court of Appeals should find that the admission of a doctor's CV,
although hearsay, was harmless error when the doctor testified verbally to the jury about
his qualifications.
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Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will not reverse a judgment merely because
there may have been error, unless the appellate court's confidence in the verdict reached
is undermined. Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107, If 50; 37 P. 3d 1130.
Issue No. 11: Cumulative weight of error doctrine. The Court of Appeals
should find that any error claimed were no error or were so minor as to result in no harm.
Standard of Review: The Court of Appeals will not apply the cumulative error doctrine
unless the cumulative effect of several errors undermines the Court's confidence that a
fair trial was had. Radman v. Flanders' Corp., 2007 UT App. 351, ^ 20; 172 P. 3d 668.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
There are constitutional or statutory provisions determinative of the issues.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
ShopKo Stores, Inc. (ShopKo) agrees only with the Statement of the Case
introduction describing the nature of the case, the course of proceedings and the decision
below submitted by Harris at Appellant's Brief p. 5-6. ShopKo asserts that Harris'
Statement of the Facts including the Background of the Litigation at Appellant's Brief p.
6 - 1 1 and Procedural History at Appellant's Brief p. 1 1 - 1 6 contains irrelevant matters
but fails to set forth facts relevant to the issues presented and omits the evidence available
to the jury supportive of the verdict.
The Accident: ShopKo generally agrees with the depiction of the accident
submitted by Harris in Appellant's Brief at p. 6-7.

S

Medical Care: Regarding past medical care:
Dr. Rosenthal, Harris' expert, testified that Harris had overused dilaudid pain pills
(Tr. 253:15-22); that Harris had developed a tolerance to the pain pills (Tr. 253:25254:10); that the care received by Harris during the 35 months between the incident and
his diagnosis was not adequate, that if his diagnosis had been made right after the
accident, the care she received would have been different, and that past treatment would
not have been necessary if she had been properly diagnosed (Tr. 311:18-312:21, 314:1122,334:3-335:6).
Dr. College, Harris' former treating physician (Tr. 550:23-25), testified that
Harris' treatment with chiropractor and massage therapy is not the kind of treatment
wrhich is going to give her the relief she is looking for and that medical scientific
evidence shows no support for massage therapy and chiropractic care (Tr. 593:25594:19); that the nerve burning treatment may provide 50% relief in 50% of the patients,
but because that treatment does not address the underlying tissue injury, it is short term
relief (Tr. 621:15-622:3); that reasonable treatment looks for functional status improving
patient working (Tr. 587:8-13), and that Workman's Compensation does not pay for
nerve burning treatment because it does not treat the injury (Tr. 622:18-24).
Dr. Rodney Scuderi, Harris' treating chiropractor admitted that the treatment he
provided is soft tissue manipulation akin to massage (Tr. 368:10-14); that his treatment
would help Harris feel well briefly but could not fix anything and was never able to
relieve the problem (Tr. 378:7-379:2); that he provided Harris 51 treatment sessions
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between April 2006 and March 2008 and charged Harris $6,200 while providing no
lasting cure (Tr. 383:6-20).
Dr. Thomas Cole Snyder, Harris' massage therapist and doctor of chiropracty (Tr.
394:4-5), admitted that he treated Harris 27 times from September 2007 to August 2008
(Tr. 405:20-21, 406:1-8), and that Harris and her husband received a couple's massage on
1 August 2008 (Tr. 407:22-408:4).
Kay Whitaker, Harris' brother and treating nurse practitioner (Tr. 510:7-20,
511:19-22, 512:19-23), testified that neither the dilaudid nor the chiropractic care were
helping Harris (Tr. 543:10, 544:10).
Tom Harris, Appellant's husband, testified that doctor appointments were not
helping her get any better; that the massage therapy and chiropractic care would provide
temporary relief for only a day or two and have to be repeated (Tr. 675:15-25).
Regarding future medical care:
Dr. Rosenthal testified that he had no way to tell what will happen and that he was
being asked to look into a crystal ball (Tr. 250:20-22); that he had developed a "worst
case scenario" to anticipate the future treatment (Tr. 324:16-25, 325:12-14); that he could
not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Harris would need dilaudid in
the future (Tr. 250:9-21, 325:5-11); that $3,600 for dilaudid in future medical care would
treat the symptom but not the cause (Tr. 323:22-324:3); and that the treatment he had
anticipated may be more or "it may be less" (Tr. 255:22-256:7, 326:5-8).
Dr. College, in addition to challenging the necessary and reasonable nature of the
nerve burning treatment, chiropractic and massage therapy, testified that future use of
7

pain pills (dilaudid) should be curtailed, that the more you take the more you need (Tr.
585:15-586:9).
Other causes of Harris' pain and injuries:
Dr. Rosenthal testified that Harris had been in three prior auto accidents for which
she received treatment, including for neck pain and possibly lower back (Tr. 241:2-12);
that his first diagnosis after the ShopKo incident was facet joint syndrome (Tr. 219:1520, 297:14-24, 298:1-5); a condition which can be caused by degeneration due to aging
and is not trauma related (Tr. 298:16-21).
Dr. Eric Hogenson, Harris' treating family doctor testified that Harris suffered
from fibromyalgia; that the onset of the fibromyalgia was years ago, going back to May
1997 in the clinic records; and that fibromyalgia is indicated by chronic pains in the
muscles, causes fatigue, sleep problems, painful and tender points at certain parts of the
body, all symptoms of which Harris is currently complaining (Tr. 359:25-360:14, 361:1362:10). He also testified that Harris had previously indicated in a medical history that
she suffered from arthritis (Tr. 353:13-20).
Kay Whitaker testified that Harris suffered from degenerative arthritis and that she
suffered from chronic pain, or at least that he reported that in his clinic records for
insurance purposes (Tr. 535:8-9, 535:23-536:12, 536:19-538:22).
Dr. Rodney Scuderi testified that the pre-existing conditions evidenced in the
medical records could be the source of Harris's pain (Tr. 387:1-24); the medical records
he was asked to consider included Alta View Hospital records 1998 indicating cervical
strain and discussing disk herniation; Alta View Hospital records May 2001 following
8

vehicle accident showing diffused neck pain; and Alta View Hospital records July 2002
indicating lumbar area pain (Tr. 385:21-386:16).
Dr. College testified that he suspected that Plaintiff had an annular tear (Tr.
576:23-577:5, 584:23-25), which is generally caused by age degeneration of the disks
(Tr. 577:16-578:10); that he could not testify with any degree of medical probability that
the suspected tear was caused by the ShopKo incident (Tr. 578:11-15); that Harris
suffered low back pain consistent with degenerative disease with radiating leg pain (Tr.
580:19-581:13, 581:14-25); that Harris suffers from desiccation of the bones (Tr. 589:22590:12) and facet disease which is the wear of the joints in the spine, and manifests itself
as back pain (Tr. 582:3-583:6); that Plaintiffs complaints are the result of all three: the
degenerative disk disease, facet disease, and an aggravation of her pre-existing conditions
(Tr. 583:14-21); that the sciatica, documented in 2002 Alta View Hospital records, would
play a role in her complaints at this time (Tr. 587:20-588:14); and that it is probable that
the degenerative disk disease is the cause of Plaintiff s current complaints (Tr. 591:1-4).
He could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical probability that Harris' complaint
were related to the ShopKo incident (Tr. 585:8-13).
Other reasons for the jury to reduce Harris' damages:
Dr. College testified that Harris had gained weight which negatively impacted her
ability to overcome her conditions (Tr. 592:14-19, 593:7-10).
Harris herself admitted that she had only attended 4 physical therapy sessions and
stopped because she thought she knew what to do without having to visit the clinic (Tr.
724:14-23). She also testified that she suffered no back pain right after the ShopKo
9

incident (Tr. 722:5-12); and there was evidence that after the ShopKo incident she
continued to perform her normal activities, and that her condition became worse over
time Tr. 728:20-729:10, 729:18-730:5).
Mr. Harris testified that right after the incident she continued to work and to
perform normal activities, but that Harris' condition declined over time (Tr. 673:23675:3,681:9-682:3,683:8-16).
Harris' use of her deposition transcript. After ShopKo used a portion of Harris'
deposition to impeach Harris during cross-examination (Tr. 728:20-729:10, 729:18730:5), Harris' counsel sought to introduce into evidence the remainder of that portion of
the deposition. ShopKo objected to the improper use of the deposition, pointing out that
no question had been asked of the witness. The Court did not rule that Harris' deposition
transcript was excluded. The Court ruled that counsel should ask a question of Harris.
Counsel began asking a question, withdrew it and closed his re-direct without eliciting
the information from his client (Tr. 732:24-734:3). Addendum of Appellant at A-6.
Chair Specification Drawing. Although ShopKo had admitted in response to
discovery that certain documents relating to the chair were accurate, the specification
drawing for the chair were not included among the documents stipulated by the parties to
be admissible (Tr.439:22-25). When Harris attempted to introduce the specification
drawing through a witness who had no knowledge of the drawing (Tr.429:16-18),
ShopKo objected and the trial court sustained the objection (Tr. 436:2-8). Addendum of
Appellant at A-7 ^ 15, 17. An exemplar chair was used as a demonstrative exhibit
throughout the trial. Harris sought to use the drawing to show the chair could be adjusted
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to a height of 21.5 inches although there is no evidence showing the height of the chair
when it gave way under Harris. Addendum of Appellant at A-8 ^ 19-20.
Present Cash Value. The trial court gave the jury an instruction on reducing
future economic loses to present cash value taken from the Model Jury Instructions over
the objection of Harris. The trial court determined that there was sufficient evidence
before the jury regarding future economic loses to warrant giving the jury the instruction.
Addendum of Appellant at A-9 to A-10.
Apportionment Jury Instruction. The trial court gave the jury instructions on
apportionment taken entirely from the Model Jury Instructions (Civil 2018 and 2019)
over the objection of Harris (Tr. 945:7-946:15). The instructions advised the jury that it
is their duty to apportion damages between those caused by ShopKo and those which preexisted the accident and that if they were unable to do so, they must assign the entire
cause of harm to ShopKo. The trial court determined that ShopKo had presented
substantial evidence that Harris' injuries could be attributed to sources other than the
incident. The trial court concluded that it would have been reversible error to not give
the instructions. Addendum of Appellant at A-11 to A-13.
Dr. College's Delayed Recovery Syndrome Testimony. Dr. College was called
because he is Harris' former treating physician. He was not called as an expert witness.
(Tr.551:1-3, 568:11-569:6). He testified at the end of his direct testimony that delayed
recovery syndrome helps explain why some of Harris' treatments, past and future, were
neither reasonable nor necessary; the consequence of the delayed recovery syndrome is
that people pursue marginal treatments (Tr. 637:3-638:2). Dr. College testified that
11

Plaintiffs pain was chronic (Tr. 584:9-11), and not caused by the ShopKo incident (Tr.
585:8-13). Although he agreed that the ShopKo incident caused soft tissue damage, he
went on to testify that the pain associated with the soft tissue injury could be expected to
heal after two to three weeks (Tr.586:10-19). He testified that after three to eight weeks
the pain is chronic, establishes new circuitry, and serves no useful purpose (Tr. 584:1013). He opined that hurt does not mean harm in this case (Tr. 583:22-584:13), and to
treat chronic pain like acute pain limits quality of life and is debilitating to the patients
(Tr. 584:17-20). Addendum of Appellant at A-14 to A-15 Iflf 37, 39.
To protect Harris' rights that a tortfeasor takes the plaintiff as he finds her, the trial
court instructed the jury that "a person who may be more susceptible to injury than
someone else is still entitled to recover the full amount of damages that were caused by
the Defendant's fault. In other words, the amount of damages should not be reduced
merely because Plaintiff may be more susceptible to injury than someone else."
Addendum of Appellant at A-15 to A-16 ^| 42.
Dr. Rosenthal's Expert Report. During the cross-examination of Dr. Rosenthal,
ShopKo referred to Dr. Rosenthal's report as "attorney drafted." Immediately prior to the
cross-examination the trial court gave the jury an instruction that procedural rules allow
an expert report to be prepared by the expert or the party (Tr. 288:20-289:5). The trial
court determined that the authorship of the report was relevant because although the
report asserted that it was based on the review of Harris' medical records (Tr. 316:2-23),
Dr. Rosenthal admitted that he signed the report before reviewing several of Harris'
medical records (Tr. 318:7-321:3). The trial court determined that the authorship of the
12

expert report went to credibility and the weight of its conclusions. Addendum of
Appellant at A-18 to A-20 ffi| 54, 56 - 58.
Testimony of Tom Harris, ShopKo generally agrees with the depiction of the
exchange regarding Mr. Harris' attempted testimony as to the couple's intimate relations
with the exception that Mr. Harris testified before Harris during the trial (Tr. 665: Mr.
Harris' testimony starts, 691: Harris' testimony starts). The trial court concluded that Ms.
Harris had the opportunity to testify freely regarding her non-economic damages but that
Mr. Harris' loss of consortium testimony was not relevant to the Plaintiffs claim.
Addendum of Appellant at A-20 to A21.
Dr. College's CV. ShopKo generally agrees with the depiction of the exchange
regarding the admission of Dr. College's CV.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Harris has failed to marshal the evidence supporting the jury's verdict so the Court
of Appeals should affirm the trial court's denial of Harris' motion for a new trial or
additur. Moreover, the trial court's decision to deny Harris' motion for a new trial
deserves to be upheld because there is significant evidence to support the jury's awards,
both as to economic and non-economic damages, and the trial court's decision rests on
reasonable bases. A jury's verdict is entitled to the greatest deference.
The trial court did not commit error and did not abuse its discretion when it
advised Harris' counsel to ask his client a question before using Harris' deposition on
redirect. Counsel could have properly used his client's deposition but abandoned the
attempt, and in so doing waived any assignment of error. Nor did the trial court commit
13

error or abuse its discretion in excluding the chair specifications drawing which had not
been stipulated as an exhibit and which Harris sought to introduce through a witness who
had no knowledge of the exhibit. Any possible error in excluding the specification
drawing was at most de minimus because there was an actual chair in evidence and there
was no evidence concerning the height of the chair at the time of the accident.
The trial court correctly instructed the jury on present cash value and on
apportionment of damages to pre-existing conditions because the evidence supported the
need for those instructions, the instructions were correct and taken directly from the
Model Jury Instructions. The instructions fairly instructed the jury on the applicable law.
The trial court did not err nor abuse its discretion in its evidentiary rulings. Dr.
College's testimony on delayed recovery syndrome was relevant to the issue of whether
Harris' treatments were necessary and reasonable. Dr. College's testimony was not
unfairly prejudicial, and the trial court protected Harris by properly instructing the jury
that a tortfeasor takes his victim as it finds her. Allowing ShopKo to refer to Dr.
Rosenthal's report as "attorney drafted" was proper because Dr. Rosenthal admitted
signing the report before reviewing the medical records which supposedly formed the
basis for the report, an issue which went to the credibility and weight the jury should give
to Dr. Rosenthal and his report. The court likewise did not err when it excluded Mr.
Harris' testimony as to the couple's intimate relationship because there was no loss of
consortium claim and because Harris herself was free to testify to her loss of consortium
and loss of quality of life.
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The admission of Dr. College's CV, although not benefiting from an exception to
the hearsay rule, was nevertheless not reversible error. Dr. College testified folly to his
qualifications, and the admission of the CV did not affect the substantial rights of the
Plaintiff. Confidence in the jury's verdict is not undermined by the introduction of the
CV into evidence.
The cumulative weight of error doctrine is not applicable. Harris received a fair
trial and the jury's verdict should stand no matter her displeasure at the results.
ARGUMENT
1. Appellant has failed to properly marshal the evidence.
"A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that
supports the challenged finding." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, the
challenger must present, in comprehensive and fastidious order, every
scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports the
very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent
array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence.
West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P. 2d 1311, 1315 (UT App 1991). See also
Balderas v. Starks, 2006 UT App. 218 ^21; 138 P. 3d 75.
Harris has lightly glossed over this heavy burden, not even conceding that there is
any evidence supporting the jury's decision, choosing instead to refer to record evidence
"that could be construed in favor of the jury's decision." Appellant's Brief at 19, 25. For
every fragment of evidence Harris deigns to mention, she argues it is "irrelevant" or
opposed by other evidence, or rendered immaterial by some legal theory she argues
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overcomes the evidence. In so doing, Harris ignores her great obligation to present the
evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's decision and to the verdict, "and not
attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to [her] case." Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82, U 78; 100 P. 3d 1177; Tingey v. Christensen, 1999 UT 68 f7; 987 P. 2d 588.
In failing to properly marshal all the evidence supporting the jury's verdict and the
trial court's decision to deny the motion for a new trial or additur, Harris has failed to
point out a fatal flaw showing that the evidence supporting the verdict was insufficient.
2. The trial court's denial of the motion for new trial must be upheld.
a. A Jury's Verdict is Entitled to Great Deference.
Our legal system provides a "general deference towards the jury's role as factfinder." Water & Energy Systems Technology Inc., v. Keil 2002 UT 32 1J15; 48 P. 3d 888.
"Because damage assessment is peculiarly a jury function, trial courts should exercise
caution in setting aside a verdict." Andreason v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 848 P. 2d
171, 174 (UT App 1993); Jensen v. Eakins, 575 P. 2d 179,180 (Utah 1981) (it is "the
prerogative of the jury to make the determination of damages"); Bearden v. Wardley
Corp., 2003 UT App, % 13; 72 P. 3d 144 (the amount of the verdict is a matter
exclusively for the jury).
The burden on an appellant to establish that the evidence does not support the
jury's verdict is quite heavy. Id. When, as here, Plaintiff seeks to set aside the verdict,
claiming inadequate damages, the Court is not empowered to entertain a motion for
Additur "when the damages are not so inadequate as to indicate a disregard of the
evidence." Onyeabor v. Pro Roofing Inc., 787 P. 2d 525, 529-30 (UT App 1990).
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The standard is not whether "the evidence introduced could have justified a larger
verdict than granted." Meyer v. H.H. Bartholomew, 690 P. 2d 558 (Utah 1984), citing to
Sprunt v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad, 340 P. 2d 85 (Utah 1959). In Sprunt,
the Court observed that
the evidence of the actual damage suffered by appellant was
not so certain that the amount granted is so inadequate as to
make it appear that it was given under the influence of
passion or prejudice or that in the interest of justice should be
set aside. Id at 88.
In Sprunt the Court went on to observe that "the jury was not bound to believe" all the
evidence presented by the Plaintiff. Id. Thus, Courts "cannot substitute [their] judgment
for that of the fact finder unless the evidence compels a finding that reasonable men and
women would, of necessity, come to a different conclusion." Jensen v. Eakins, at 180.
b. The Evidence Supports the Jury's Verdict.
Here, Harris wanted the trial court to ignore, and wants the Court of Appeals to
ignore the evidence supporting the verdict. Specifically, there is a great deal of evidence
to support the conclusion that much of Harris' past treatment was not necessary or
reasonable. Harris' expert, Dr. Rosenthal, concluded that the past treatments would not
have been necessary if she had been properly diagnosed. Harris sought reimbursement
for 51 chiropractic sessions, 27 massage therapy sessions (including a couple's massage),
and physical therapy sessions, which were not helping her get better and provided only
temporary relief. Dr. Scuderi agreed that the chiropractic treatments he provided Harris
were akin to soft tissue massages. Dr. Rosenthal also found that Harris overused pain
pills, and that the pain medication only served to treat the symptom and not the cause.
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Dr. College, Plaintiffs former treating physician testified that much of the treatment
Plaintiff pursued was marginal, lacked medical scientific support, was calculated to
provide only short term relief, or was excessive.
Harris' evidence in support of planned future treatment was weak and lacked the
indicia of necessity and reasonableness. Again, the evidence regarding fiiture care
supports the jury's verdict. Dr. Rosenthal, upon whom Harris relies to support her
desired future treatment, testified that he could not be sure what treatment she would
need, and that he could not testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that Harris
would need dilaudid in the fiiture. Dr. College testified that the future care contemplated,
nerve burning treatment, chiropractic and massage therapy, is ineffective, does not
improve function and has no lasting effect.
There is also abundant evidence supporting the jury's verdict based on the
existence of pre-existing conditions which were responsible for some of Harris' pain and
injury. There is ample evidence that Harris suffers from degenerative disk disease,
including annular tear, bulging disk, facet joint syndrome, disk herniation, desiccation,
and ligament hypertrophy. All of these symptoms and conditions are natural, associated
with aging and not the result of a single incident of trauma. Dr. College testified that it is
probable that the disk degenerative disease is the cause of Harris' current complaints. Dr.
Scuderi concluded that pre-existing conditions could be the source of Harris' pain. Dr.
Rosenthal testified that his first diagnosis for Harris' complaint was facet joint syndrome
which can be caused by disk degeneration due to aging and is not caused by trauma.
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In other words, there was abundant evidence for the jury to conclude that some of
Harris' past treatments were not reasonable and necessary, that some of the future
treatments were not reasonable and necessary, and that some of Harris' physical
complaints were not the result of the ShopKo incident. The evidence that Harris'
condition deteriorated over time also supports assigning the blame for her complaints in
part to her advancing pre-existing conditions. Ultimately, there is no evidence that all of
Harris' injuries were triggered by the ShopKo incident.
Harris cites to Biswell v. Duncan for the proposition that a dormant condition that
is made painful by the defendant's action renders the defendant liable. Biswell v. Duncan,
742 P. 2d 80, 88 (Ut App. 1987). Although this is good law, and the trial court so
instructed the jury, Biswell is not applicable to Harris' case. In Biswell there was no
evidence opposing plaintiffs assertion that all her pain was the result of the accident. Id.
Unlike in Biswell, in this case, there was testimony from Harris' own doctors that the preexisting conditions could be the source of her pain. In this case, Harris was simply
unable to clearly establish that her pain derived from and was caused solely by the
ShopKo incident. She did not meet her burden of proof.
c. Round Numbers do not Signify an Arbitrary Decision by the Jury.
Harris argues, without any legal authority for support, that the round numbers of
the awards suggest the jury acted arbitrarily. Appellant's Brief & 30. The fact that the
jury preferred round figures however is not sufficient to invalidate a verdict. See e.g. Pan
Am. Bankshares Inc. v. Trash, 278 So. 2d 313 (Fla. App 1973) (fact that jury verdict was
in round figure insufficient to show that verdict was compromise verdict.). ShopKo has
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found no Utah decision supporting Harris' speculation that round figures indicate
arbitrariness. Rather, the issue is whether the jury's award, even expressed in round
numbers, is supported by the evidence.
Harris points the Court of Appeals to the Judd v. Rowley case, in which the
Supreme Court ordered the verdict increased from $15,000 to $15,761.48 because the
jury had reduced the special damages without evidentiary support. Judd v. Rowley, 611
P. 2d 1216, 1221 (Utah 1980). However, the Court in Judd did not rule that the round
number was evidence of an arbitrary decision, so Harris gets no support for her theory
there. Unlike in Judd, the jury here had copious evidence to support reducing past and
future medical costs for lack of necessity and reasonableness, because there is evidence
that some of the future treatment is not attributable to the ShopKo incident, and because
of Harris' own behavior, abusing pain pills, failing to control her weight, and not
following through with physical therapy.
d. The Noneconomic Damages do not Evidence Passion or Prejudice.
Harris argues that the $1,000 she was awarded in noneconomic damages is
inadequate and evidences passion or prejudice. She relies on Robinson v. All-Star
Delivery, 1999 UT 109; 992 P. 2d 969. However, Robinson does not support Harris'
case. In Robinson, the issue was whether the trial court had erred in refusing to instruct
the jury as requested by the plaintiff. The Supreme Court ruled that because the evidence
as to apportionability was in conflict, "the trial court should have instructed the jury on
what to do if it was unable to apportion damages in a reasonable manner." Id at \ 14. In
this case, the trial court did instruct the jury that if they were not able to reasonably
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apportion damages, they must conclude that the entire harm was caused by ShopKo (Tr.
945:7-946:4). Addendum of Appellant at A-12 ^ 32.
The cause of the jury only awarding Harris $1,000 in noneconomic damages is
that the evidence supports such an award. The evidence showed that the ShopKo
incident would produce only soft tissue injury, and that the greater amount of pain and
suffering was caused by the prior medical conditions, which even Harris5 expert stated
were not caused by the ShopKo trauma.
There was also evidence that after the ShopKo incident, Harris continued to
maintain her previous activities for some time. Tom Harris testified that over time,
Plaintiff "became less and less able to function at that level." Plaintiff testified that after
the ShopKo incident, she continued to "vacuum, cleaning, take care of the home" and
"run errands, go to appointments, physical therapy." This evidence is consistent with the
conclusion that much of the suffering Harris feels come from her naturally advancing
pre-existing conditions.
Finally, there is evidence that Plaintiffs pain and damages were, in part, caused by
her own actions. The discharge summary from physical therapy dated 23 June 2006
listed "failure to attend sessions" as the cause of discharge. Plaintiff had only attended
four sessions. Dr. College testified that Plaintiffs overuse of pain killers had likely
intensified her pain level. Many of the doctors, including Dr. Rosenthal, Plaintiffs own
expert, discussed Plaintiffs overuse of pain medication and the increased tolerance to the
pain medication caused by excessive and frequent use (Tr. 251:12-252:2). He stated that
increase tolerance leads to higher use and dependency (Tr. 253:23-254:10, 325:15-24).
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In particular, Dr. College was critical of Plaintiff s expectations and handling of
her chronic pain. He testified that quality of life is more influenced by what we do on our
own, rather than what is done to us by others (Tr. 594:20-595:7). He particularly
disapproved of the pain clinic mentality which promises to eradicate all pain from one's
life, observing that there is certain value to becoming more resilient to the opposition that
comes to us and we become stronger through it. (Tr. 628:9-12). He observed that Harris'
weight had continued to rise during the period of time he treated her, and noted that this
was important because the added weight increased her pain and lack of functionality (Tr.
592:14-593:10). He testified that if is important for people to be responsible for their
own health, that treatment is what others do to us, but the most important is what we do
ourselves (Tr. 593:3-5, 594:20-595:7).
Given all this evidence, it is not reasonable to assume that the jury acted with
passion or prejudice. There is substantial evidence to conclude that the jury believed that
ShopKo's liability for Plaintiffs noneconomic damages was limited. The evidence here
does not compel a finding that reasonable men and women would, of necessity, come to a
different conclusion. The standard is not whether the evidence introduced could have
justified a larger verdict. Harris' evidence in this case was simply not so certain.
3. The Trial Court did not commit reversible error.
a. The Court did not Err in Ordering Harris' Counsel to Question Harris Before
Using her Deposition in Re-direct.
Harris argues that not allowing the use of her deposition on redirect unfairly
prejudiced her because it did not allow her to rehabilitate her credibility, it gave the jury
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the impression she had not been limited in her activities after the ShopKo incident, and
because testifying as to what she had meant in her deposition would result in the jury
'very likely' perceiving her to engage in Post-hoc justification. Appellant's Brief &i 36.
None of these results, if they occurred, were caused by the trial court's ruling.
Harris's counsel abandoned the issue, failed to ask his client a question, and
waived his opportunity to rehabilitate Harris. Counsel could have simply asked Harris if
she recalled her deposition, if the partial statement used by ShopKo's counsel was
complete and what the rest of her deposition testimony had been. Had Harris' memory
failed, counsel could have sought to refresh her memory by asking a leading question or
even showing Plaintiff her own deposition, and then asking another question. See URE
612. Harris' counsel could have asked Harris to testify about her level of activities.
This was not the first time in this trial that Harris' counsel had faced this issue of
how to use a deposition to rehabilitate his witness. In Harris' redirect testimony of Dr.
Hogenson, the same issue arose. At that time, the trial court instructed counsel to ask a
question first (Tr. 363:21-364:16).
In Utah, a party who abandons a line of questioning or fails to pursue her remedy
during the trial waives the issue thereafter. Chournos v. D'agnillo, 642 P. 2d 710, 713
(Utah 1982). In Chournos the Supreme Court observed that "counsel had waived any
objection" by announcing to the Court "that he had no further evidence to offer." Id. In
this case, Plaintiffs counsel stated "I withdraw the question, nothing further" and ended
his redirect examination (Tr. 734:2). As the Utah Supreme Court observed, post trial
remedy is not "intended to give attorneys the option of waiting until after the case has

been decided adversely by the Court before they pursue deficiencies in their proof." Id.
See also Walker v. Hansen, 2003 UT App 237; 74 P. 3d 635 fl[18: Plaintiff waived
objection to whether the Court would allow questioning of witness by not questioning
that witness).
Harris asserts her counsel understood the trial court's ruling to be an exclusion of
the deposition and that it was an ambiguous ruling. Appellant's Brief dX 37-38. This
issue was not raised below to the trial court, and should not now be raised for the first
time on appeal. cTn order to preserve an issue for appeal, the issue must be presented to
the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue."
438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, \ 51; 99 P.3d 801. Here the trial court
never had the opportunity to evaluate whether the judge's ruling was ambiguous because
that issue was not raised in Harris' Rule 59 motion for a new trial. "Issues that are not
raised at trial are usually deemed waived." Id. Moreover, given that this was the second
time the issue had arisen, the Court of Appeals should not accept this claim of ambiguity.
Finally, even if the Court's ruling was error, which it was not, URCP 61 provides
that Courts may disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties. URCP 61. Here, as in Walker v. Hansen, Plaintiff has
not demonstrated that the Court's ruling on the use of Plaintiff s deposition has had any
affect on her substantial rights or the outcome of the trial. Walker v. Hansen at ^f 19
("Nor is it clear from the record that the trial court improperly limited Walker's
examination of Dr. Sawchuck or whether Walker's trial counsel elected not to call this
witness"). As shown above, the reason for the low amount of damages awarded by the
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jury is the lack of necessity and reasonableness for past and future medical treatments,
the evidence of pre-existing conditions, and the lack of evidence that ShopKo is
responsible for all of Harris' complaints.
b. The Court did not Err in Excluding the Chair Specification Sheet.
Harris argues that it was reversible error for the trial court to sustain an objection
based on foundation and to exclude a chair specification drawing. She asserts that an
admission made in answer to a request for admission during discovery admits to
foundation. Appellant's Brief &\ 39. Admission of a fact in discovery however does not
waive any objection to admissibility, nor does it waive any objection to foundation.
URCP 26(b) makes clear that "it is not ground for objection (to discovery) that the
information sought will be inadmissible at trial." The trial court noted that admission did
not waive foundation at trial (Tr. 436:2-8).
Although URE 901 (b)(1) does provide for authentication through the testimony of
a witness with knowledge, the Rule does not provide for authentication through discovery
admission. Plaintiff sought to introduce the specification sheet through the testimony of
ShopKo employee, Sean Briggs, who had no knowledge regarding the chair (Tr. 429:1618). Sean Briggs had no basis to know anything about the document (Tr. 438:1-12).
None of the other bases for foundation established in URE 901 (b) are present in this
case. Therefore, the Court correctly sustained the foundation objection.
Harris admits she did not ask ShopKo to stipulate to the introduction of the
drawing (Tr. 439:22-25). Appellant's Brief at 41. Therefore, Harris had no reason to
anticipate that ShopKo would waive the foundation requirement. Harris argues however
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that ShopKo should have objected to the pre-trial disclosures and that the trial court
abused its discretion when it found good cause to excuse the lack of objection. Utah R.
Civ. Pro. 26 allows the trial court to excuse any waiver for good cause. URCP Rule
26(a)(4)(C). Here the trial court found good cause because Harris should have included
the drawing sheet in the items to which the parties stipulated (Tr. 441:12-20, 442:4-5).
Addendum of Appellant at A-7 to A-8 ^[18. Had Harris asked for the stipulation, she
would have learned she needed to lay a foundation for the specification sheet, or she
could have gained a stipulation as to foundation from ShopKo.
Harris claims the exclusion of the specification sheet was harmful error. But the
trial court found that Harris suffered no harm from the exclusion because there was an
exemplar chair which the witnesses, including Harris, used during their testimony and
which the parties used during closing arguments. Addendum of Appellant at A-8 ^[19.
Harris seeks to create reversible error because ShopKo's counsel mentioned the height of
the chair during opening statement as being 19 inches, when the chair was possibly
susceptible of being set to a height of 21.25 inches. Appellant's Brief at 42. There is
however no evidence available regarding the height of the chair at the time Harris fell
from the seat, so the jury would not have been helped by that information.
Moreover, Harris again seeks to assign reversible error for her counsel's tactical
decision. Harris admits her counsel did not object to any statement made by ShopKo's
counsel regarding the height of the chair, "as part of a litigation strategy." Addendum of
Appellant at A-8 to A-9, \2\.

In State v. Hall the Court of Appeals declined to consider

a defendant's plain-error arguments where "the alleged errors reasonably resulted from
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defense counsel's conscious decision to refrain from objecting or if defense counsel led
the trial court into error;' 946 P. 2d 712, 716 (UT App 1991). The Court in Hall also
cited to State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1211 (Utah Ct.App.1991) where the Court
refused to consider plain-error argument because "it was within counsel's professional
discretion to not object to testimony that would aid [trial] strategy".
c. The Trial Court did not Err in Instructing the Jury on Present Cash Value.
Relying on three inapposite cases, Harris argues that the trial court erred in
instructing the jury on present cash value for future damages. Appellant's Brief dX 43.
Harris cites John Call Engineering v. Manti City for the proposition that "it is not a
plaintiffs burden to produce the evidence on which any reduction of damages is to be
predicated." 795 P. 2d 678, 680 (Utah App. 1990). Call Engineering dealt with a claim
for breach of contract and a defense that plaintiff had not mitigated its damages. The
reduction of damages spoken of by the Court of Appeals in that case refers to mitigation
of contract damages. No such claim is pending in this matter. Similarly, Ault v. Dubois,
dealt with damage to real property. It is in that context that the Court of Appeals held
"where damage to realty may be measured either by diminution in value or by the cost of
restoration, and the plaintiff gives evidence only as to one, it is up to the defendant to
show that the other measure of damages would be less." 739 P. 2d 1117, 1120-21 (Utah
App. 1987). This is not a case where damages can be measured by alternative theories.
In this case, it is the Plaintiffs burden to prove the reasonableness and necessity of her
past and future desired treatments, and of the cause of her complaints.
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Harris argues that ShopKo should have introduced evidence regarding how the
jury should reduce future damages before the trial court could properly instruct the jury
on present cash value. Appellant's Brief at 43-44. Her argument rests on an inaccurate
reading of the trial court's order addressing motions in limine and on cases involving the
admissibility of annuity tables {Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking) and mortality tables
{Bennett v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co.). Neither support Harris5 contentions.
In Gallegos, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to exclude all
evidence regarding annuities. Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking, 2004 UT App. 322, ^[10;
110 P. 3d 710. The Gallegos case involved complex issues of how to invest future
damages of between $14 millions and $52 millions. Id, % 20. Given the complexity of
investing such large sums, evidence regarding annuities was admissible. Similarly, in
Bennett v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., the Supreme Court ruled that a
mortality table was properly admitted. 213 P. 2d 325, 328 (Utah 1950). Once again, the
issue dealt with the admissibility of evidence to assist the jury in deciding complex issues
dealing with life expectancy and large sums of damages. These situations are much
different from the present case.
In this case, Harris sought future medical expenses of $39,574. Appellant's Brief
at 1. ShopKo challenged the future medical expenses on necessity and reasonableness,
and did not challenge the costs of future medical treatment. The trial court determined
that Harris' evidence regarding future damages was presented as the current costs of her
desired future medical treatments. Addendum of Appellant at A-10, Tf 25. Given the
relatively minor amount involved, ShopKo had no need to introduce annuity information;
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nor did the trial court order ShopKo to submit such information. In its pre-trial order, the
trial court expressly ruled that "while expert testimony to reduce future damages to
present value would no doubt be helpful, it is not required to present the issue to the
jury." (R. at 380).
As the Court of Appeals noted in Gallegos, "in Utah, a finder of fact must
discount damages for future losses to the present cash value." 2004 UT App. 322, ^f 11.
Since there was some evidence to support future damages, the trial court here properly
instructed the jury, and no error can be assigned to the jury instruction.
When reviewing the jury instructions, the Court of Appeals will affirm when the
instructions taken as a whole fairly instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case."
Clayton v. Ford Motor Co., 2009 UT App 154, f 8; 214 P. 3d 865; State v. Hobbs, 2003
UT App. 27, ^ 31; 64 P.3d 1218. In this case, the jury instructions as whole fairly
instructed the jury on the applicable law.
d. The Trial Court did not Err in Instructing the Jury on Apportionment.
Harris argues that instructing the jury on apportionment was error because she
does not believe that there was any evidence upon which the jury could rely to apportion
injury to the pre-existing conditions. Appellant's Brief at 45. Contrary to Harris5 claim,
the trial court determined that the instruction was appropriate because "ShopKo presented
substantial evidence that Harris' injuries could be attributed to alternative sources."
Addendum of Appellant at A-10, ^f 28. In fact, there is abundant evidence that preexisting conditions were responsible for some of Harris' pain and injury. There is ample
evidence that Harris suffers from degenerative disk disease, including annular tear,
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bulging disk, facet joint syndrome, disk herniation, desiccation, and ligament
hypertrophy. All of these symptoms and conditions are natural, associated with aging
and not the result of a single incident of trauma. Dr. College, Harris' former treating
physician, testified that "it is probable that the disk degenerative disease is the cause of
Plaintiffs current complaints." Dr. Scuderi, Harris' chiropractic physician, concluded
that "pre-existing conditions could be the source of Plaintiff s pain." Dr. Rosenthal,
Harris' expert and treating physician, testified that his first diagnosis for Plaintiffs
complaint was facet joint syndrome which can be caused by disk degeneration due to
aging and which is not trauma related.
The instruction given by the trial court protected Harris by advising jurors that if
they were unable to reasonably apportion damages, they must conclude that the entire
harm was caused by ShopKo (Tr. 945:7-946:15). Addendum of Appellant at A-10, ^f 28.
Again, the trial court properly instructed the jury, and no error can be assigned to the jury
instruction. As the Utah Supreme Court has held, "if the jury can find a reasonable basis
for apportioning damages between a preexisting condition and a subsequent tort, it should
do so; however, if the jury finds it impossible to apportion damages, it should find that
the tortfeasor is liable for the entire amount of damages." Tingey v. Christensen, 1999
UT 68, \ 15; 987 P. 2d. 588.
e. The Trial Court did not Abuse its Discretion by allowing Dr. College to Testify
on Delayed Recovery Syndrome.
Near the end of his direct testimony, Dr. College was asked about delayed
recovery syndrome. The testimony was brief. He explained that the syndrome is relevant
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when trying to determine best treatments for injuries because injured persons are known
to take longer to recover. (Tr. at 597: 22-598:10). He explained that Harris showed signs
of the syndrome and connected that to the nonessential nature of some of the treatment
pursued by Harris, including the use of excess narcotics and marginal medical treatments,
including massage therapy and chiropractic treatment which do not result in resolution of
pain or injury. (Tr. at 599:17-23; 637:3-638:10; 638:18-640:12). Dr. College concluded
that the issue has to do with the severity of the disability or incapacity subjectively
reported by Harris. (Tr. at 640:4-9). Dr. College was critical of Dr. Rosenthal's
approach. Dr. College testified that the ShopKo incident would have produced soft tissue
injury which would have healed within a few weeks, and that any pain thereafter was
chronic pain (not caused by trauma) and should be treated differently. (Tr. at 586:10-19;
584:12-20; 594:10-19). He was critical of marginal medical treatments which mask pain
but do not treat cause (Tr. 592:24-593:3, 594:4-19, 621:16-622:3, 624:14-20, 637:4-14).
Harris mischaracterizes the testimony of Dr. College, referring to the syndrome as
"a psychosomatic weakness" a label which Dr. College never used. Harris asserts that
the testimony was not relevant, should have been excluded under URE 402, was overly
prejudicial and should have been inadmissible under URE 403. Appellant's Briefat 4547. Prior to Dr. College's testimony, however, Harris objected to the testimony arguing
that Dr. College was not an expert, that the matter amounted to improper character
evidence, and that it would be "more prejudicial than probative given his lack of
expertise in the field." (Tr. at 560:1-14). Harris also objected on the ground that the
syndrome is "a generalized idea" and that it would be improper to apply it to her. (Tr. at
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562:23-563:2). The trial court ruled the testimony admissible, finding that Dr. College
was qualified to testify on the subject, that as Harris' former treating physician he could
testify with specificity about Harris, and that the testimony was relevant to the issue of
damages. (Tr. 562:14-21; 563:19-564:2). The trial court's ruling is entitled to great
discretions and will only be overturned upon a finding of clear abuse of discretion. Slisze
v. Stanley-Bostitch, 1999 UT 20, \ 17; 929 P. 2d 317.
URE 401 defines relevant evidence as "evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." URE 402 provides that
"all relevant evidence is admissible... Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."
A trial court has broad discretion to determine whether proffered evidence is relevant
under Rule 401. State v. Hobbs, 2003 UT App 27,ffif11, 26, 64 P.3d 1218 (quoting State
v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, ^j 17, 999 P.2d 7). The evidence of the delayed recovery syndrome
is relevant because it makes more probable that the treatments Harris sought were not
reasonably necessary based on the ShopKo incident. Dr. College's entire testimony
revolved around the fact that Harris was chasing the impossible, the complete resolution
of all her ills, and that the ShopKo incident was simply the means and method for that
resolution.
URE 403 provides in part that "although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury." A trial court is granted broad discretion when
weighing the probative value of evidence against the reasons for exclusion enumerated in
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rule 403. State v. Bluff, 2002 UT 66, % 56, 52 P.3d 1210 (a trial court's ruling under Rule
403 is reviewed for abuse of discretion); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 937-38 (Utah 1994)
(noting that "a spectrum of discretion" exists and "toward the broad end of the spectrum
is the decision to admit or exclude evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403"). A trial
court is in the best position to make evidentiary rulings as they arise because it can
evaluate the claims and the evidence already admitted or proffered. Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920, 923 (Utah 1990) (noting the "trial court's
advantageous position" in "reviewing questions of admissibility of evidence at trial").
When deciding whether to apply Rule 403 's exclusionary protection "the critical
question is whether certain testimony is so prejudicial that the jury will be unable to fairly
weigh the evidence." State v. Downs, 2008 UT App 247 17; 190 P. 3d 17. "Absent a
substantial, not potential or minor, prejudicial effect, the evidence is admissible for the
jury's consideration in reviewing all other facts." Id. emphasis in original. As the Utah
Supreme Court has observed "in a broad sense, almost all evidence is [prejudicial].
There is little reason to offer evidence if it does not cast doubt or prejudice on the
opposing party's position." Robinson v. All-Star Delivery, Inc., 1999 UT 109 ^ 28; 992
P. 2d 969. Utah Courts should "have confidence in our juries to appropriately weigh
evidence that may be adverse" to a party. State v. Downs % 7. In this case, the delayed
recovery syndrome was not overly or unfairly prejudicial to Plaintiff, because Dr. College
was clear that Plaintiffs pain was real and that Harris was not a malingerer (Tr. 601:6-12,
602: 4-13). He also testified that disc degeneration which is painless can flair up with
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trauma and agreed that the ShopKo caused trauma caused some of Harris' (Tr. 642:12643:7).
College also testified that Harris caused a lot of her pain by overusing pain pills
(Tr. 627:2-6), and explained why the treatments she sought, massage therapy,
chiropractic therapy, and her overuse of pain medication were unnecessary and
unreasonable. Dr. College's testimony on delayed recovery syndrome must be evaluated
in the context of his entire testimony and not separated and distorted through an out-ofcontext analysis. Utah State Road Commission v. Johnson, 550 P. 2d 215, 221 (Utah
1976); Child v. Gonda, 972 P. 2d 425, 431 (Utah 1998) (appellate courts to evaluate
testimony "in its context").
f. The Trial Court did not Err in Allowing ShopKo to Refer to Dr. Rosenthal's
Report as "Attorney Drafted."
Harris asserts that the question of who drafted an expert's report is not relevant to
the credibility of that expert witness. Appellant's Brief at 52. Although the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedures allow the practice of parties drafting expert reports (See URCP
26(a)(3)(B)), that practice may raise credibility issues and may go to the weight that a
jury might give to a report in certain circumstances. This is one of those instances.
Dr. Rosenthal admitted on cross-examination that he had not read all the medical
evidence before signing the report, even though the report asserted otherwise. He
testified that, although the report's first line stated it was "based upon the review of the
Plaintiffs medical records" (Tr. 316:2-23), Dr Rosenthal had, in fact, not reviewed the
Alta View Hospital's records, the Spanish Fork clinic records, the South Towne
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Chiropractic records, nor the Central Utah Clinic's records, nor Dr. College's records, nor
the Utah Neurological Clinic's records, nor Dr. Gardner's report, nor the Intermountain
Healthcare and Eric Passage's records, not the Massage Envy records, nor Dr. Jackson's
records, nor the South Valley Physical Therapy records, nor the MRI from August 2007,
nor the pre-ShopKo incident records. In fact, Dr. Rosenthal admitted that, although the
report claims he had reviewed the medical records, he had only reviewed a summary of
those records prepared by Plaintiffs counsel, prior to signing the report (Tr. 318:7319:3). Surely these facts go to the credibility of the witness and his report.
Moreover, although prejudicial, these facts, and ShopKo's counsel's commenting
on the authorship of the report, are not "overly prejudicial" such as to require they be
barred pursuant to URE 403. See discussion on URE 403 above. The trial court advised
the jury at the start of Dr. Rosenthal's cross-examination that "pursuant to Rule 26, a
witness who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony in a case is
required to submit a written report. That report may be prepared by either the witness
who is testifying or a party." Tr. 288:20-289:5.
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury understood that a party drafting a
report is proper under the rules, while also concluding from Dr. Rosenthal's own
testimony, that Dr. Rosenthal's opinion and report lacked credibility. The trial court
determined that the authorship of the report went to credibility and to the weight of its
conclusion. Addendum of Appellant at A-18 - A-20, ^[ 54, 56-58.
Harris concedes that she had the opportunity to address the implications raised by
the authorship revelation in redirect, that Dr. Rosenthal testified that after he signed the
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report he went back and reviewed all the medical records, and that he found nothing
which would cause him to change his report. (Tr. at 332:24-333:20). Anticipating the
attack on credibility by ShopKo, Harris had also sought out the same information during
the direct examination of her expert. (Tr. 234:17-235:9). In conclusion, Harris has
brought nothing to cause the Court of Appeals to conclude that the trial court abused its
discretion on this issue.
g. The Trial Court did not Err when it excluded Mr. Harris' Testimony on
Conjugal Relations.
Harris argues that the trial court committed error when it excluded Mr. Harris'
testimony regarding lack of intimacy. Harris argues that Mr. Harris should have been
allowed to testify on the lack of intimacy as evidence of Harris' noneconomic losses.
Appellant's Brief'at 56. But Harris admits that she had the opportunity of testifying on
the subject of her intimate relations with her husband, and bemoans the fact that "the
testimony was far too brief and general." Id. note 16. Surely the tactical decision, for
whatever reason made, to not have Harris develop fully her loss of enjoyment of life
during her testimony should not be the basis for assessing error to the trial court. Harris'
argument on this issue is even more difficult to accept given that Mr. Harris testified
before Harris. Thus, Harris, knowing that Mr. Harris had not testified as to the loss of
intimacy in the marriage, had all the more reasons to address the issue with the jury.
Harris argues that not allowing Mr. Harris to testify as to the loss of conjugal
relations accounts for the "incredibly low" general damages award. Appellant's Brief at
56. In advancing that argument, Harris ignores all the evidence before the jury which
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supports the general damages award. Defendant did not attack Plaintiffs testimony
regarding her loss of quality of life, only the cause of that loss of quality. The evidence,
reviewed above, is that Plaintiff suffered from preexisting conditions, including
degenerative disk disease and fibromyalgia, and that much of her loss of enjoyment was
caused by those preexisting conditions and her by own actions.
The trial court found that Mr. Harris' testimony about his lack of intimacy would
have offered nothing to the jury's consideration of how Harris herself had been damaged.
In light of Harris own admission that she did not testify fully and expressly about that
particular loss of enjoyment of life, the trial court was not wrong. It may well have been
that Mr. Harris found the loss of conjugal relations more of a loss than Harris herself.
Absent Harris5 own testimony on this issue, the trial court was not wrong to exclude Mr.
Harris' testimony on his own loss, since no loss of consortium claim was before the jury.
h. The Admission of Dr. College's CV was Harmless Error.
Harris assigns fault to the trial court for admitting Dr. College's CV. She relies on
a criminal case dealing with pre and post motive to fabricate information, State v. Bujan,
2006 UT App. 322; 142 P. 3d 581 for the proposition that using hearsay to bolster the
testimony of a witness is improper. Appellant's Brief at 57. However, unlike in Bujan,
here there is very little likelihood that a different outcome would have resulted, and
confidence in the verdict is not undermined.
Although a CV is technically hearsay, CVs are routinely admitted into evidence as
a material aid to the trier of facts. Moreover, if a witness testifies to the points on his CV,
exclusion serves little purpose. And, if an appeal becomes necessary, exclusion of the
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CV deprives the appellate court of a convenient summary of those facts asserted to
support the qualifications of the witness.
Harris asks the Court of Appeals to assign reversible error to the admission of the
CV. But an error is considered harmless if it is sufficiently inconsequential that the Court
of Appeals can conclude that "there is no reasonable likelihood that the error affected the
outcome of the proceedings." Gallegos v. Dick Simon Trucking, 2004 UT App. \ 19
(citations omitted). Reasonable likelihood means reasonable probability, or "probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. Given the evidence adduced
from all the witnesses, including Harris' own doctors and expert, there is substantial
evidence to support the jury's verdict, and it is not reasonable to infer that the jury would
have awarded greater damages if Dr. College's CV had not been admitted into evidence,
especially since he had testified to all the points in his CV during his testimony (Tr.
567:15-568:3, 569:15 - 571:22. Dr. College's testimony was important, effective, and
assertive, unlike that of Dr. Rosenthal who sounded cautious, tentative and uncertain.
4. The cumulative weight of error doctrine does not apply.
Harris seeks to have the Court of Appeals throw out the jury verdict based upon
the weight of her assignment of errors. She argues that the many claims of errors she has
brought are sufficient to undermine the Court's confidence that the trial was fair, and she
wants the Court of Appeals to determine that she was denied the ability to fully and freely
litigate her case. Appellant's Brief dX 58.
Although Harris has claimed many errors, the Court of Appeals should determine
that the majority of the claims do not constitute error, and that any error is so minor as to
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result in no harm. Harris asserts that she was also negatively impacted from the Court's
decision to not allow written motions in limine after the deadline for filing such, although
the trial court allowed Harris to bring all the verbal motions in limine she desired to
present. Plaintiff asserts that "creating a situation that demanded split second judgments
without the ability to read and consider the relevant authorities" created an "atmosphere
in which errors abound." Appellant's Brief dX 59. It is axiomatic however, that Harris,
knowing she would make oral motions in limine, would have prepared prior to the
opening of trial, and had an opportunity to review all relevant authorities. It is also
axiomatic that motions in limine may be made in writing or orally to the Court.
Harris was allowed to fully present her case to the jury. She testified, was allowed
to call all witnesses she wanted and needed, was allowed to call her expert, was allowed
to cross-examine all of Defendant's witnesses, and was allowed to argue her case to the
jury. Ultimately, she was denied only her husband's testimony regarding their intimate
relations (though she could have testified to that herself and failed to do so), was denied
the publication of a portion of her deposition (though, again, she could have testified
directly about the subject matter in that portion of her deposition, but her counsel waived
that opportunity), and was denied a particular specification sheet regarding the chair
(although there was an actual chair present and in evidence before the jury).
The trial court allowed ShopKo to refer to Harris' expert report as "attorney
drafted" because it went to the weight and credibility of Harris' expert, given the fact that
the report as written, was in part misleading. That was not error, and Dr. Rosenthal was
able to testify that after he read the materials upon which the report was based, he had no

objection or correction to make to the report. The trial court also allowed Dr. College's
CV to be introduced in evidence, but that error was de minimus because Dr. College
testified to all the points in his CV so the jury already knew his qualifications. Finally,
the trial court allowed Dr. College to testify on delayed recovery syndrome, finding it
relevant to the issue of necessity and reasonableness for the past and future treatment.
Given the evidence adduced from Harris' own witnesses, Dr. College's testimony was
relevant and not overly prejudicial. Finally, Harris complains about the instructions to
the jury regarding present cash value and apportionment. Again, given the evidence
submitted to the jury, the instructions were correct, and on the whole fairly instructed the
jury on the law applicable to the case.
In order to apply the cumulative weight of error doctrine, the Court of Appeals
must find that errors undermine the Court's confidence that a fair trial was had. The
evidence here simply does not justify such a finding.

40

CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals should affirm the results below and dismiss the appeal.
DATED this j % day of September, 2010.

CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C.
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